Resumen. Documentos inéditos de los archivos de Moscú Comintern demuestran la intervención de Comintern y sus consecuencias para la orientación política de los militantes revolucionarios en Colombia a partir de los últimos años de la década de los 20 que coinciden con la creación del Partido Comunista en Colombia. 
However, before these questions can be addressed it is necessary to make some brief introductory remarks about the economic and political background against which a revolutionary movement could emerge.
At first glance, Colombia was a typical Latin American country, with the majority of the population living in rural areas under miserable conditions, often subsisting from manifestly precapitalist labor. Like other Latin American countries, Colombia was linked to the world market through the export of minerals and agricultural products and the import of British merchandise. Since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, coffee, brought from remote Andean regions to the ports, had been the principal export product. Transport (via railways and steamships on the Rio Magdalena) constituted the first modern sector of the Colombian economy, with the participation of foreign capital and the concentration of capitalist wage work. Additionally, the export economy included economic enclaves directly controlled by foreign capital. From the beginning of the twentieth century, the United Fruit Company controlled an extensive banana zone near Santa Marta on the Caribbean coast. There were also centers of oil extraction, the most important of which was the Tropical Oil Company, a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey, located in Barrancabermeja. Workers in these enclaves faced "imperialism" in a direct sense: they lived at the mercy of foreign companies that had established exclusive zones of domination with the consent of the Colombian government.
The coffee economy and the foreign enclaves determined the dynamics of economic development, which increased in the 1920s because of rising coffee prices, the influx of foreign loans, and the US$25 million compensation paid for the loss of Panama. This produced what was called the "Dance of the Millions," resulting in economic leaps accompanied by widespread corruption and waves of social mobilization. The rapid economic development in the 1920s was in sharp contrast to the stagnation of the political system at the end of several decades of Conservative hegemony. Although Colombia was formally a democracy with periodic elections, the relation between the two parties of the ruling elite, Conservatives and Liberals, was still burdened by the heritage of a long period of civil wars at the end of the nineteenth century, in which the Liberals had been militarily defeated. There were several attempts to establish a kind of bipartisan rule or at least to include Liberal politicians in important government functions.' However, the Conservative party tried to perpetuate its domination in every way possible, including electoral fraud. At the end of the 1920s repressive laws against "subversion." made a constitutional change of the government through fair elections extremely unlikely Additionally, there were still Liberal ex-generals who hoped to oust the Conservatives by military action. Their "revolution" meant nothing more than the use of violence to terminate a repressive and unpopular Conservative government. Nevertheless, this limited concept of revolution was the basis for seeking an alliance with radical parts of the workers' movement that sought to follow the example of the Russian October Revolution.
As in other Latin American countries, the early labor movement in Colombia was marked by the tradition of artisan organizations. It was, however, fundamentally different from those of Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Brazil, where Italian, Spanish, and German immigrants brought with them the main tendencies of the workers' movement of that epoch, such as anarchism and the Marxist socialism of the Second International. In Colombia there was no massive immigration to establish a similar link to European left-wing traditions. The perception of the "social question" was generally marked by social Catholicism with vague reformist ideas. However, there was a growing consciousness that workers' interests were not adequately represented by the traditional parties, and this led to the creation of the first Socialist party in Colombia in 1919. Of course, the upheaval in Russia and the end of World War showed that a victorious fight against a repressive regime was possible. Even before Lenin had been read, there was a glorification of Bolshevism and its leaders. It is reported that during an antigovernment demonstration of artisans on March 16, 1919, the crowd shouted '"Viva la Revolucion!" and ";Viva el Bolchevismo!" (Vega Cantor, 2002, vol. 4: 165) . As early as July 1919, visitors to a working-class quarter of Bogota were surprised to find "Bolshevik" street names such as Carrera Trotsky and Calle Lenin (Vega Cantor, 2002, vol. 4: 169 ).
An entire generation of intellectuals, mostly journalists, writers, and lawyers, welcomed the October Revolution as the beginning of a new era. Their enthusiasm for the Russian example did not necessarily mean that they wished to imitate it by creating a Leninist party in Colombia. In fact, most of these leftists supported the new leadership of General Benjamin Herrera, who had proclaimed a kind of moderate socialism. The most brilliant figure among the intellectual sympathizers of Soviet Russia was Luis Tejada, coeditor of the left-liberal periodical El Sol, which was established in 1922. In 1923 Tejada published some reports and reflections concerning the Russian Revolution in El Espectador. He emphasized the worldwide importance of Lenin, concluding with a "prayer that Lenin should not die" (Torres Giraldo, 1978, vol. 3: 713-715 Giraldo, 1974, vol. 4: 3-12; Medina, 1980: 99-104) .
COLOMBIA IN THE DEBATES OF THE COMINTERN
It was not until the Sixth World Congress that Latin America was explicitly placed on the agenda of an important Comintern meeting. In view of the previous contacts and declarations, it is perhaps an exaggeration to speak of a discovery of Latin America by the Comintern in 1928 (see Lowy, 1982; Kheyfets, 2004; Mothes, 1997) Concerning the facts of the strike, Mahecha's report was essential, and no one criticized his version of events. 14 According to Mahecha, the strike preparation had been excellent: 32,146 workers were ready for an insurrection that had been carefully planned, including the distribution of arms. The failure of the strike was due only to the "indecision of the comrades in Bogota. They did not give us solidarity for the strike nor the order to start a revolution" (Movimiento, 1929: 121 committee was in charge of carrying out a military mission, to prepare the fight and drive it against the police and army; the strikers' logistics, the direction of the logistics cooperative, conducted the strike as a whole and was the superior organ. All the power of the strike was concentrated in its hands and, in a specific moment, the power of the whole region. ... He•e we have a strike committee working as a soviet, transforming itself into the region's soviet.
That is not so complicated. (Arango, 1985: 145-146) . 29 In Anecdotario ( Guerra, 1985) .
2.
Enrique Olaya Herrera, for example, served the Conservative government as ambassador in Washington before becoming the first Liberal president.
3.
For many details on the early history of the Colombian labor movement, the work of Ignacio Torres Giraldo (1974 Giraldo ( -1978 is still the fundamental source. For a synthetic view of the formation of the Colombian working class, see Achila Neira (1991) . Vega Cantor (2002) links the economic background to the characteristics of protest movements in particular sectors and regions and deals with the history of socialist ideas and socialist organizations. Vanegas (2003) offers detailed information on the socialist movement before the establishment of the Revolutionary Socialist party.
4.
Savitsky had come to Colombia after failing in a mission that had taken him first to China (see Montana Cuellar, 1973: 131, and Torres Giraldo, 1978, vol. 3: 740) . For a synthesis of the available information on him, see Kheyfets and Kheyfets (2001: 8-14) .
5.
On the Socialist Conference and the Workers' Congress, see Villegas and Yunis (1976: 493-496) and Torres Giraldo (1978, vol. 3: 735-743 ).
6.
Documents in the Russian archives on this first attempt to form a communist party have been interpreted in a recent essay by Kheyfets and Kheyfets (2001) .
7.
Achila Neira (1991) and Vega Cantor (2002) demonstrate the existence of an anarchist current in Colombia which has generally been underestimated because of the negative judgments of Ignacio Torres Giraldo, the most important witness of those times.
8.
The best-known of these leaders was Maria Cane, a teacher and political activist from Medellin, who received the honorary title "The Flower of Labor."
9.
Humbert-Droz was a founder of the Swiss Communist party and worked in the central apparatus of the Comintern from the Third Congress on. He was responsible for the "Latin"-speaking countries (Belgium, France, Italy, and Spain, including Central and South America) until 1929.
10.
According to all the available information, this figure is certainly exaggerated.
11.
The massacre is a key event in Gabriel Garcia Mdrquez's novel
One Hundred Years of Solitude.
12.
Humbert-Droz protested against the intervention of Stalin in the German party in favor of Thalmann. At a meeting of the presidium of the Comintern executive committee on December 19, 1928, Humbert-Droz was formally condemned (Humbert-Droz, 1971: 317-356) .
13.
In This is quite remarkable in view of later criticism. In the official history of the Communist Party of Colombia, Medina (1980: 133) 15.
An abridged version of this letter appears in the memoirs of Gilberto Mejia V. (1986: 55-67 
18.
Prieto, in a letter to the central committee of the PSR in November 1929, had ridiculed "observers situated in Patagonia" who wanted to guide armies at the other end of the continent, giving orders for combat and even for expulsion. At a meeting of the "Politburo" in January, he called the South American Secretariat incompetent and destructive and asked the PSR to send a direct delegate to Moscow to resolve the problems (RGASPI, f. 495, op. 104, d. 44, . Prieto himself left the PSR, presumably soon after the January meeting.
19.
There were internal debates in a PSR bureau and plenary meeting at the end of January 1930. In spite of the inconvenience of withdrawing
Castrillon at the last moment from the presidential campaign, some of those who attended argued that the orders of the Comintern must be obeyed without criticism (RGASPI, f. 495, op. 104, d. 44, .
20.
In the official history of the party published in 1960, there is not a word about the condemnation of Castrillon by the Comintern leadership.
Instead, it is said that the socialist candidature of Castrillon awakened popular enthusiasm, whereas the majority of opportunistic leaders of revolutionary socialism turned away from Castrillon and supported the bourgeois candidate (Partido Comunista de Colombia, 1973: 20) .
21.
This quotation from. Guillermo Hernandez Rodriguez is taken from the article on. Castrillon in the biographical dictionary of the Comintern (Jeifets, Jeifets, and Huber, 2004: 75) .
22.
During the internal conversations of Comintern representatives with Colombian revolutionary socialists in Buenos Aires, the future of Guillermo Hernandez Rodriguez ("Guillen") and his return to Colombia were discussed in detail.
23.
For a general analysis of rituals at the Lenin School, see McLoughlin, 2003: 85-112, and Kostenberger, 2007: 287-309) . 
25.
The circumstances of his expulsion are unclear. It is regrettable that the biography written by his daughter contains very little information about the discrimination against Tomas Uribe Marquez after the establishment of the Communist Party of Colombia (Uribe, 1994: 310-312 Guerra, 1985) .
28.
One should compare these remarkable letters with the documents of self-criticism that Torres Giraldo wrote in Moscow at the same time.
Much later, Torres Giraldo tried to do justice to Maria Cano in a book he wrote shortly before his death (Torres Giraldo, 1972: 149-171; Maria, 1985: 92-101) .
29.
In the second edition of a book of interviews with survivors of the banana strike of 1928, Carlos Arango published a brief biography of Mahecha based on interviews with his widow and his daughter Luz.
30. There was no "Marxism-Leninism" before Stalin; he created this doctrine to attach the authority of great thinkers to a pseudo-theory legitimizing his rule.
